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Chapter 9

.#In and of Itself Nothing Is Finite"
Schelling's Nature (or So-called Identity)
Philosophy
Michael Vater
When Ficbte and Schelling parted philosophical company early in 1802,
the chief reason was their inability to come to agreement on the nature of
transcendental phiJosopby after Kant While they both eschewed Kant' s
term· transcendental argument, by which Kant meant a grand hypotheticaldeductive structure that went beyond empirical concepts and hypotheses
and secured the possibility of a unified and systematic field of experience1
and instead u·sed the word 'construction' that Kant used for mathematical
procedures,2 they disagreed considerably on the nature and scope of philosophical construction. 3
Ficbte, in revisions to the Jena Wissenschaftslehre publically announced in
the 1797/98 Philosophical Journal which be published, argued that in fulfilling the invitation to "think oneself' the thinker gains access to a territory prior
to any divide between subject and object, where thinking and acting coincide.4 In this self-reversion, Ficbte finds an alternative to the quasi-objective
'self-positing' that was introduced as system-principle in a epistemic or
hypothetical-deductive way in the 1794/95 Grundlage; he now calls it intellectual intuition, an intuition or immediate consciousness of self-positing as
p ositing or self-reverting activity.s The thinking of oneself initiated by the
summons (or intellectual stimulus) to ' think oneself reveals the agility of
self-reverting thought, the ability to tear oneself out of a prior state of repose
and initiate no vel activity (Kant' s noumenal freedom)--or to slide from the
function of being 'c oncept' to that of self-constituting 'intuition.' 6 In the selfpositing revealed in intellectual intuition, the knower is actor, and the agent
is real insofar as it realizes itself in folding back upon itself. The intuition that
establishes itself in this way is 'one' or sui generis; empirical selves may be
deemed multiple in a derivative social context where 1-hood is inferred from
sensory intuitions of behavior, but self-activity or self-consti tution as such
19 J
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is unique. From Fichte's point of view, then, there is simply no predication
possible of anything like an I or its activities to anything that is not capable
of thought and free action.
The same year that Fichte announces that alterations to bis system
are underway, Schelling begins to explore the possibility of an idealistic
philosophy of nature or, as he will later call it, a speculative physics. Schelling
is at pains in the philosophical reflecti ons that bookend the specific con ideration of natural phenomena such as magnetism, light, and gravity in the
1797 Ideas fo r a Philosophy of Nature to indkate that philosophy of nature
is a human undertaking, hence a work of freedom, but that its object is oot
dead matter or things unseen, in the manner of Kant' s things-in-themselve ?
Schelling acknowledges that while be ought to deduce the possibility of
nature or an aU-inclusive platform of experience, the idea of philosophy is
itself the result of philosophy, and that of a universaLly valid philosophy
is as yet "an inglorious idea1."8 Lacking an a priori starting point, Schelling
offers instead a historical-critical introduction to those parts of physics and
chemistry that can be accommodated by the idea of opposed forces and their
equilibrium. The general problematic that philosophy of nature must work
out is a solution to the problem of realism and idealism. Neither a dogmatic
system that thinks our knowledge is grounded in causation by external
objects, nor a Kantian account of causality from the side of the subject,
will suffice. Both Spinoza and Leibniz provide two-sided solutions, but not
grounded in human acti vity. The ideal of a productive or genetic account is
borrowed from Fichte' s early jdeas on the form philosophy can take, and the
idea of objective purposiveness embodied in organic nature provides a vision
of where a philosophy of nature should go.9 The very idea of a philosophy
of nature, however, remains problematic: "Nature should be Mind made visible, Mind the invisible nature. Here then, in the absolute identity of Mind
in us and Nature outside us, the problem of a possibility of Nature external
to us must be resolved." 10
Two years later, with the publication of the First Outline of the System of
the Philosophy of Nature, Schelling views the problematic character of the
new discipline as surpassed, for the unconditioned is now seen to be pre ent
in nature as infinite activity, and nature is viewed not as a field populated by
self-subsisting things, but by apparent products or actants, the outcome of
Limitations.11 Transcendental philosophy alone has access to the absolute or
unconditioned, and that implies that it finds its principle not in any single
being, nor in the total aggregate of beings, but in being itself. Any Jesser
domain, if it is to be a science, must similarly encompass being itself, not
aggregates of beings. 12 So the philosophy of nature will take the form of an
ongoing deduction of forms of limitation upon unconditioned activity, and be
capable to some degree of being integrated into a transcendental philosophy

"In and of Itself Nothing Is Finite "

193

built on the same model-a scheme followed in great detail by the 1800
System of Transcendental Idealism.
Evidently it is sufficient for Schelling in 1799 that nature is active and
composed of finite processes rather than dead extended stuff in order to guarantee that nature is originally dynamic and to confer 'transcendental' status
on the philosophy of nature. If all primitive qualities are agents or "actants,"
somethings which are more like Fichtean 'strivings' than atoms of Cartesian
'extension,' matter can then be 'constructed' out of a plentitude of inhibited
actants, each of which is a filling of space and not a cutting out of a patch
of pre-existent space. Putting vanishing agency behind observable products
makes the field of actants (or actants-become-products) into a form that
empiricism can recognize: "The philosophy of nature has nothing to do other
than to recognize the unconditionally empirical in these actants. Empiricism
extended to include unconditionedness is precisely philosophy of nature." 13
The filling of space is the very definition of matter, and matter in all of its
evolved configurations is the field of nature.
On one level, the dynamic atomism of the First Outline is quite fertile.
The 1797 Ideas got stuck at the level of organic nature, for its basic construction was a mechanical atomism. The Outline is able to straightaway tackle
that which is the ultimate problem for a mechanism, namely, life, and to
append a construction of the inorganic to the primary deduction of the organism. Schelling's primary construction is quite ingenious-a field of incessant
change which evolves regulative parameters, where change itself is both the
principle of lawfulness or order and the agent of disrupti on, and the ratios
of actant to product determine the emergent qualities in nature. Nature as a
whole is an absolute organism, but its singular instances are more or less
mutant and only by being realized (or 'produced') all at once approximate
the ideal and form a continuum of species which are not chronologically or
developmentally related. 14
The crucial question, however, is whether the process philosophy of the
First Outline is 'transcendental,' or whether the upsurge olf atomic activities
postulated behind natural qualities is sufficiently active to qualify as activity
in Fichte's sense-self-positing, self-reverting agility. There seems to be a
difference between the activity that Fichte claims one can empirically experience in the dyadic situation of responding to the summons "think yourself,"
in which case two singular instances of I interact on an empirical level, but
only the respondent feels the transition between repose and activity, and the
indefinite multiplicity, perhaps infinity of actants postulated by Schelling to
explain matter and its states. {1) On an empirical level, Fichte can say, much
like Gertrude Stein quipping about Oakland that "there's no there there," that
there is oo 1 or self-reversion enacted in Schelling's hypothetical plenum of
'little bangs. • (2) Schelling bas a metaphysical problem which be explicitly
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encounters in the 1801 Presentation of My System, namely, explaining the
positing of being as such as infinitely many individual beings or actants
without having the systematicity problem Jacobi diagnosed as the fatal flaw
of Spinozism, namely, "egress from the absolute." But Ficbte also has a
problem: (3) Whether and how the 'foot on the accelerator' feeling of agility corresponds to self-constitution or the unrestricted activity indicated by
the first fundamental principle of the 1794 Grundlage. Put bluntly, what is
to distinguish transcendental argument fro m the unanchored metaphors of
science fiction ?

THE FICHTE-SCHELLING CORRESPONDENCE
ln the course of making some practical arrangements for a united forum or
institute for transcendental idealism in the wake of Kant' s 1799 repudiation
of the Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte and Schelling are forced to confront djfferences that bad arisen in their philosophical outlooks since 1795. While
residing together at Jena they regarded each other as friends and colleagues
embarked upon a common project, securing the Critical philosophy from
skeptical attack and providing a single systematic form to communicate il.
When Fichte resigns his position at Jena over the 'atheism' controversy and
moves to Berlin, an exchange of letters begins that shows tbe two thinkers
moving in opposite directions in their common effort to erect a system of
transcendental idealism. Building on hints given in the Vocation of Man,
Fichte wants to expand the Wissenschaftslehre's ethically based theory of
cognition in a theological direction, amplifying the check or summons that
determines and ultimately individuates me in social-ethical interpersonal
interaction to a theory of interdetermination in an invisible or 'intellectual'
world, a community of spirits} 5 Schelling had been moving in an opposite
direction, toward a philosophy of nature based on idealistic principles, where
action was primary and not mere mechanic mQtion, and where a dynamic or
speculative physics would explain the corporeal or material dimension of the
individual I's circumscribed agency and cognition. While Fichte' s new direction was largely aspirational, by 1800 Schelling had turned the categorical
apparatus of action and limitation of the First Outline into a motor for the
elaboration of a comprehensive theory, the System of Transcendental/dealism. That work cleverly made the finite subject's cognitive apparatus into an
evolution of stages of nature, joined the idealism of the Wissenschaftslehre
to it as a second part, a social philosophy-etbics-pbilosophy of history, and
crowned the whole construct witb a treatment of aesthetic intuition or artistic
genius. A sort of objectivism pervades the whole work: activity cannot appear
except as limited, or as exhausted in its product. The first-person point of
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view, implicitly guiding the whole Fichtean project of exhibiting the reality of will and its free act as the foundation of the phenomenal world, had
seemingly disappeared.
When Fichte upbraids him for the naturalistic tone of the whole project
and for the inclusion of a segment on the philosophy of nature in particular, Schelling's reply is that he is engaged in an enlargement of the
Wissenschaftslehre, having set off in a direction tangential to the circumscribed territory of the finite agent and her social and moral life, but with
the hope of returning to its first principles having enlarged its territory. 16 The
agent in Fichte's philosophy, which Schelling calls the ideal subject-object,
is but a higher exponent or power of a more basic form of subject-object
identity, the real ground of nature.17 Schelling's choice of metaphors borrowed from geometry and mathematics is not accidental; both philosophers
appeal to geometry, with its conceptual necessity founded upon an intellectual seeing that in tum depends on a process of sensible in tuition-the
construction of exemplary lines and figures-for a model of bow philosophy's work-construction in intellectual intuition- must proceed. 18 What
Schelling fails to do, either for the reader or for Fichte, is to argue for the
basis of the similarity between the moral circle of Wissenschaftslehre and the
newly drawn tangent of Naturphilosophie, or between the higher power of
subject-object identity we directly experience as moral agents and the sort of
agency that nature exhibits in the dynamic motion that makes nature cohere
as a dynamic system, or potentially a universal self-regulating organism. One
would have to read Schelling's essays in the philosophy of nature almost as
carefully as their author to get the point, but the vitalistic view of motion in
nature as self-originating and self-regulating bas been implicit in the First
Outline and 1800/01 General Deduction of the Dynamic Process and is
underscored by Schelling's pejorative comments on mechanism and Newtonian experimental science in the lengthy presentation of the philosophy of
nature in the 1801 Presentation of My System. The essence of mechanism,
readily seen in Descartes and Spinoza, is the belief that physics can deal
only with imparted motion or kinetic energy and is in no position to give an
account of originary motion. The idea of a self-moving sphere or a cosmic
animal whose movements and processes are self-regulated was not foreign
to ancient physics, but it drops out of modem physics. Moderns like Fichte,
and probably the author and readers of this piece, simply cannot see any
similarity between the motion of a natural object, the behavior of the animate
being, and the conduct of a cognizant subject. Only if there is an aspect of
Kantian willing-initiating a new line of causality in the phenomenal world,
independent of what preceded-on view in the world will Schelling's idea
of a basic subject-object identity that can be raised to a higher exponent or
reduced to a lower one gain any traction.l 9
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THE NATURPHILOSOPHIE OF SCHELLING'S 1801
PRESENTATION OF MY SYSTEM
In the course of their discussions in 1801 Schelling sentFichte both volumes
of his Journal for Speculative Physics and asked him to pay speciaJ attention to the Deduction of the Dynamic Process and to the Presentation of My
System. While the latter might be viewed as a public statement responding to
items under discussion in the letters, its preface makes but a passing reference
to the question of whether Ficbte and Schelling are on the same path. It was
actually skepticaJ questions about the possibility of an idealistic treatment of
nature and its independence from other philosophical domains posed by Karl
Eschenmayer' s review of the First Outline that occasioned the Presentation. 20
We need but look to a few points about the Presentation. its preface, and
the basic mode.l of being relative to individual beings that is propounded in its
initial section. Schelling maintains that what be has published hitherto, both
the tentative essays in the philosophy of nature and the more polished presentation of transcendental philosophy-including ethics and social philosophy,
philosophy of history, and aesthetics-have been but one-sided glimpses of
a larger systematic view privately held. This view is the 'indifference-point'
between nature and spirit and it bas not been on display in earlier works. 21 In
the closing words of the preface, Schelling calls his comprehensive metaphysics ' the System of Identity' ;22 in later years be will often assert that be used
this term once only, in an extra-systematic context, and that the Presentation
and the works and lectures following on through 1806 were really part of the
larger project of Naturphilosophie. 23
The system that Schelling offers in the Presentation postulates that, foreign
as the procedure is to most persons in most aspects of their lives, thinking
inhabits a domain of reason governed by the law of identity (A = A) that
expresses the logical sameness or ultimate congruence of subjectivity and
objectivity. From that point of view, aJl phenomena or concrete entities
are seen to involve a deviation or a doubling\ a dissociation of factors such
that what is intrinsically real (A = A) seems to exist as indefinitely muJtipJe
instances of (A= B), relative being. Properly understood, each relative being
is an identity or an association of subjectivity and objectivity, rather than tbeir
indifference, and not just any difference, but a difference (A = B) inflected
one way of the other, as +A = B or as A = B+and so more or less subjective
or more or less objective. 24
So far it might seem as if the notation, not the philosopher, was doing all
the talking. But A= A is not a dry logical formula; it is an identity of identity
and expresses the ultimate congruence of infinite being and infinite knowing. If there is such an ultimate congruence, it must express itself infinitely
in such a way that it exists and knows itself only in and as the interaction
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or interdependence of endlessly many finite beings. In the Spinozistic perspective that Schelling employs in this work, being is power and cannot not
express itself. If it is infinite power, it exists as endlessly many finite beings,
each of which is infinite or identical in itself, and whose fimtude or difference is self-annihilating in agency and cognition-sex and love don 't make
the short list until 1803/04. For our purpose of understanding the workings
of nature, it is important to realize that nothing is finite in itself, or that
every individual entity, properly understood, is infinite.25 The sorts of relations, frameworks, motions, and processes that nature concretely puts before
the philosopher demonstrate the merely apparent or vanishing nature of
finitude-or the obsolescence of the individua1.26
Schelling translates the evaporating nature of the finite or the hiddenness
of its infinitude within appearances into a language that be thinks is precise,
so precise that it can be translated into mathematical notation and even given
geometrical expression. If the absolute is the primal indifference of subjectivity and objectivity, every finite instance of it is a distortion of identity by difference, or an inflection of indifference toward relatively greater subjectivity
or objectivHy: every A= A~ A= B, either as +A= B orA= B+. The notation
should make it perspicuous that the difference between the absolute and the
finite individual is unreal or a matter of semblance, and that the difference
between individuals can be quantitative, never qualitative.
Tbis yields a grid of four possibilities for ontology: any two items can be
qualitatively different or inclifferent, or quantitatively different or indifferent.
There is no qualitative difference. Quantitative clifference distinguishes the
'subjects' and 'objects' of appearance, and also groupings of things relatively subjective vis-a-vis groupings of things relatively objective. There is
no explaining what we now call the ontological difference: both being and
beings, finite individuals and the absolute, are the same-identity or indifference, only nuanced by a positive or negative quantitative label which is extrinsically attached. All of this gets packed into one formula: the absolute and the
universe, or totality of individual finite entities. are identical or qualitatively
indifferent, while individuals relative to one another are quantitatively different, as well as groupings or classes of individuals (powers or potencies) that
are likewise quantitatively different from one another. Nowhere is there anything qualitatively different. Quantitative indifference obtains in the whole or
in the totalities relative to their members (in the potencies), and quantitative
difference obtains between inclividuals and between potencies contrasted to
one anotber.27 There is simply no explaining how quantitative indifference
appears as quantitative difference, or bow reflection sees things differently
than reason-evidently this is the price one has to pay for being a systematic
monist. Schelling's attempt at precision and perspicacity here must be judged
a failure. for Fichte, who took careful notes while reading these theorems,
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straightaway accused Schelling of having in troduced clifference, quantitative
differe nce, into the absolute-the very thi ng he was trying not to do.28
Schelling proceeds to the deduc tion (or construction) of the c hlef features
of nature by deploying two overlapping explanatory schemes: (1 ) the powers
or potencies of relative identity appeari ng in the guise of cliffere nce, where
the first has objectivity prep onderant, the second subjectivity or .ideality,
and a third wherein they are equated or reestablished in relative identity,
and (2) the ontological expressivity or degree of reality of the three powers:
relative identity, relative duplicity, and relative totality. The items grouped
under these principles are no t 'bodies' or di screte chunks of matter, nor little
monadic minds; the A = B's or apparent instances of difference which stand
out from the embracing identity which is their sole reality are the shadows of
identity distorted, each an entity, so to speak, having a mental and a phys.ical dimension. A's and B's don' t exist independently; there are no atomic or
corpuscular bodies or dise mbodied little minds, and there is no Newtonian
aquari um space to contain them or en tropic stream of becoming to temporally
push them along. In their de nse self-expression, they establish and occupy
the dimensions of space; in their ex-istence they establish the first existent,
matter. They act out, as it were, the possibility for identity and difference
between one item and anothe r: linearity or the line posited by relative identity
and difference of A and B, angul arity or the dissociation of one line from
another, and their synthesis in depth or clissociation returned to relative identity. If these items are the dimensions of matter, they are simultaneously the
construction of space and the occupati on of that space.29 Being is dynamic or
self-realizing-presumably this is what Plato meant by defining it as power,
Spinoza as endeavor to exist, and Leibniz as appetition.
Let us consider Schelling's treatment of one main feature of natural organization in 1801, the deduction of gravity. Matter is a realization of A = B;
it is fl uid and non-localized. One of its components or tendencies is infini te,
acti ve, and empiricalJ y invisible: A, the so-called cogni zing or associating
factor; the other is limited, resistant, objecti ve. The second corresponds to
what Kan t called resistant force, the firs t to bis hypothetical attracti ve force.
Schelling decided back in 1799 that either these two had to work upon some
pre-existing chunk of materiality or that they bad to be yoked by a comprehensive third force, the force of gravity. Various regions of matter (the fl uid
universe) will be characterized more by repulsion or attraction; only the totality will be gravity in its state of equilibrium, the basis of nature's being. But
thls account is too simple, as static as a mathematical equation. The dynamic
element of gravity is that the sim ple analysis obtains only if A and B are
posited as real, as dynamicall y opposed in any one patch of the primary existent-or among any two patches. 30 This sets up a chicken/egg problem fo r all
of nature: is gravity primary and the associated factors derivative? Or are the
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A's and B's primary and their association or identification derivative? And
how exactly are the A 's and B' s said to be both 'real ' in this first potency?
There seems to be an indecision here at the basis of being: to be continuous or to be discrete? Does reality in its very material basis suffer from a
Hamlet-complex at the quantum level? That Schelling at this stage chooses
to introduce a distinction be does not clarify until1809, that of being and the
ground of being, is not helpful. The problematic nature of gravity (one item?
two? three?) does motivate the elaboration of connection and individuation at
higher levels, but there seems to be a root difficulty in trying to map the three
elements of the cognitive situation (knowing, knower, known) onto the three
aspects of gravity (equilibrium, attraction, repulsion).
If one steps back and reflects on what Schelling has done here in the first
step of the construction of nature, one can see that Nan.trphilosophie is not
philosophy of science or some intellectual reconstruction of the findings of
empirical science. It is dynamic or speculative physics. Schelling's interest is
not in isolated beings or dead entities analyzed down to their ultimate physical
components, but the vital pulse of nature (Spinoza's natura naturans) that
underlies its mute thereness and materiality (natura naturata). The pseudothings that mechanistic physics takes as the glue that holds its particles
together: gravity, light, the dynamic polarities seen in magnetism, electricity,
conduction, are the real 'things' of nature-not the work of occult 'forces' but
the expression of the power of identity to overcome the shadow difference of
individuation or particularity. From the standpoint not of empirical observation and experiment, but of the imaginative (or in-folding) insight of intellectual intuition, finitude undoes itself and is seen to be a willful withdrawal
from interdependence, community, or life in what Schelling starts in 1802 to
call idea-that which is seen by mind, not by sensible eyesight.31
If the goal of Naturphilosophie is to reveal life, complexity, and metamorphosis, then there will be something at work in it that is inimical to definition, fixity, and segregation of phenomena from one another. Nature does not
operate as a duchy, church, or university. Redundancy in strategies and explanations will make a linear and hierarchical account impossible, while overlapping accounts threaten the human taste for simplicity, elegance, and paucity
of hypotheses. While Schelling does not yet embed a principle of anarchy
or 'irreducible remainder' in the bowels of nature, it is not just the tangle of
axiomatic deductions that make this text difficult, but the variety of primitive processes that are now and then adopted as explanatory models. There
is a simple enough homology that displays itself in the major order or levels:
gravity, with its coupling of repulsive and attractive forces; light~ with its
passage through translucent bodies and its refraction from opaque; and magnetism, with its polarity and reversals of polarity, display a simple taxonomic
skeleton. Cohesion in various bodies, variances in mass, and the resistance of
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phenomena such as conduction of beat or electricity to kinetic explanations,
or of chemical interactions to a simple alterity or oxidation or deoxidizati on
all work counter to the imposition of simple schemes. And Naturphilosophie
must also deploy these organizational schemes while at the same time reflecting the disorder of the current findings of empirical disciplines. 'Development' in nature is a somewhat contradictory idea too, for in Schelling's time it
meant the elaboration of Stufenfolge, an archaeological stratigraphy of nature
instead of an evolutionary history. 32 The whole endeavor itself has to be situated in the history of science and the history of philosophy, which lends the
whole enterprise a certain quaintness or irrecoverability.

Naturphilosophie in the 1803/04 Complete System of Philosophy
ln lectures delivered at Wtirzburg in 1803/04 Schelling returned to the
Spinozism of the 180 1 Presentation, thls time providing extensive commentary on theorems which were there presented in the all too brief style
of axiomatic derivation. The problematic language of the earlier exposition,
with its turgid vocabulary of 'quantitative indiffere nce' and 'quantitative difference,' is replaced by a view of reality as self-expressive or affirmation, an
identity (or copula in propositional terms) of affirming and what is affirmed.
The two systematic requirements, unity of principle and completeness of
explanation, coincide so that the identity of God and the universe is evident
and Jacobi 's constraint met-that there be no 'egress from the absolute' or
derivati on of concrete individuals that exis t outside the embrace of the absolute. These goals cannot be met, however, without reinterpreting the individuals of the expressed universe as ideal entities, ideas, while the apparent ' real '
things of experience or finite individuals are seen to be self-sundered from
their ideas, their systematic context, and hence· deceptive imitations of the
ideal order. In their ersatz self-positing, finite individuals declare a pseudoindependence and translate the absolute's all-at-once expression of reality
inside the potencies into a temporal succession or a scission between possibility and actuality, making each individual a private history of the world,
or a history of the world from one very determinate location. 33 Once again,
Naturphilosophie occupies the bulk of the lectures and does the heavy argumentative lifting: if our senses seem to present us with discrete independent
items, and our empirical sciences exhibit law-like interconnection among
them, consideration of nature from reason's perspective shows that finitude
is a vanishing determination. Upon inspection, what at first presents itself as
being turns out to be merely the ground of being.
The System's treatment of God or absol ute identity that Schelling offers in
1803/04 is tightly argued from premises both epistemological (the identity of
knower and known in knowing) and metaphysical (God is expressive or an
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affirmation that is both affirming and what is affirmed). The key point is that
when, or if, human cognition lays aside jts subjecti vity or point of view in
intellectual intui tion, reason coincides with the absolute's self-affirmation.34
And this divine self-affirmation is not merely logical or a mathematical
theorem. It is self-realizing or powerful, a conquest over the possibility of
nonbeing:
The fo rm of th e absolute affirmation of [and] by itself which constitutes the very

essence of the absolute is . .. repeated in reason and its light reveals how we
grasp the absolute, true and proper mediation between itself and knowledge . ...
[T]he idea of God in the s piritual world is the first affirmation of all reality;
there is no reality other than that whk h exists and which is affirmed by virtue
of the idea of Him, yet this idea has no affirmation outside itself; it is its own
affirming and affirmed. The absolute light, the idea of God, strikes reason like a
flash of lightning, so to speak, and its luminosity endures in reason as an eternal
affirm ation of knowledge. By virtue of this affirmation, we grasp the eternal
impossibility of nonbeing that can never be known nor comprehe nded, and the
ultimate question posed by the ve rtiginous intellect hovering at the abyss of
infinity: "Why [is] something rather than nothing?", this question will be swept
aside forever by the necessity of Being , that is, by the abso]ute affirmati on of
Being in knowledge. 35

One might can this passage Schelling's 'llitchcockean moment,' the ontological argument reconfigured as a cliff-hanger, played in the philosopher's
home-theater and projected by the Malebranchean internal light. This is the
point whence the most extreme conception of Schelling's later metaphysics
takes its origin : that the di vine is free over against being. even free to exist
or not exist. Henceforth Schelling's philosophical imagination co ntinually
yokes being with nonbeing-always a moment that is not merely puzzling or
self-contradictory, but "vertiginous."

General Naturphilosophie: The Construction of Nature
or the Real Universe
Non being continues to play an important part in the Wtirzburg System , which
among all of Schelling's many texts on Naturphilosophie has the peculiarity
of placing a general philosophy of nature ahead of a more specific consideration of natural phenomena. General (or ontological) philosophy of nature
displays the role of nonbeing, or merely relative being, in nature's particular
entities, for the particular exists in a double (or indecisive) way-bo th in the
idea, hence in God, and 'in itself' or in the double frameworks of shadow
alterity: space and time, gravity and light, motion and rest, and contraction and
expansion. In treating these shadow frameworks, Schelling crafts a picture of
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nature from mechanistic elements derived from Spinoza's and Kant's physics and from vitalistic elements borrowed from Leibniz, for the particular
in nature is monadic in character: a kernel of spontaneous or self-originated
agency beclouded by the passivity enforced by its external relations to other
particulars. Indeed the external realm of particulars is like a rainbow, a refraction of the light of infinite substance through the prism of nonbeing; the
individual item, the particular that both subsists in the idea and exists in itself.
is like the double-image Goethe produced in one of his optical experiments,
which in volved viewing a lighted object directly through a prismatic lens.36
Space, time and causal interrelation are of course the formal characteristics
of appearances, as Kant said, but rather than their being empty a priori intuitions, they are shadows cast by being tha t has opted to live outside the absolute or to hide its infinity. Though these formal characteristics are amenable
to numeration and can be accounted magnitudes, actual infinity has nothing to
do with endless or indefinite numeration, argues Schelling, citing Spinoza's
example of the actual infinite as the incommensurable areas of two circles,
one of which contains the other, but neither of which bas the same center. The
infinity of matter is first directly seen in the organism, in its self-regulating
or homeostatic character-or its being a dense system of systems.37 That the
finite individual finds itself placed in endlessly enumerable space and time
and finds its ever-perishing substance only in causal relations to others similarly situated is an index of its privative status, its pertaining to nonbeing.
Motion, if it is spontaneous, is the interforming (lneinsbildung) of time and
space, but mechanical motion is but externally imparted force exerted upon
mass or the bare impenetrable stuff that fills space. Mass or the occupation
of space by merely inertial matter (Masse) is the most degraded exhibition
of spontaneity or self-movement. The inertial thing exhjbits not the rest (or
motion) of substance, but only passivity, "an mborn imperfection, like an
original sin of matter. n 3S
Newton's physics considers space, Lime, matter, gravity and light to be
independent items of nature, separately quantifiable and interrelated only
through mathematical models. Schelling's treatment of these parameters
finds them all intertwined and ontologically based. Gravity is not a case of
externally imparted motion, or motion o f one finite body relative to another.
Each quantum of material mass is related to the center, to the infinite substance of nature which is its ground; in this grounding of the apparent motions
of indi vidual bodies relative to one another one finds "the true system of preestablished harmony ." Schelling criticizes Newton's pos tulation of attractive
force and Kant' s hypothetical construction of matter from repulsive and
attractive forces; credit goes to Franz von Baader, instead, for positing gravity
as an independent and substantial thing, one of which attraction and repulsion
are specific attributes. The 'Law of Gravity' that physics seeks is not to be
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found in extrapolation from Kepler's laws of the motion of planetary bodies
but in a mathematical-ontological postulate: "every point [in nature] is the
mid-point.,.39 It is futile to search for gravity as a discrete empirical phenomenon, for it is the hidden ground of nature:
The ground of gravity is thus the uncliscoverable depth of nature itself that can
never step into the light of day, since it is that through wruch everything is born
wruch sees the light of day, the mysterious night or fate of everything, or the
maternal principle of things, since things subsist jn it as the ground in which
they are conceived and from which they are bom. 40

If gravity is the ground of the reality of things, light is their cause; gravity
is the same in all, the identity of essence, or bare particularity, while light is
the principle of distinction or in-sich-selbst-Seyn.41 Time and number, which
is abstracted from it, are merely apparent features of phenomena, which are
simply eternal in the absolute. When the particular is posited in space or
withdraws from the eternity of absolute identity, the future is established as
the real dimension of time: the negation of totality, the past as the negation of
unity, and the present not as their identity but as their mere non-difference.
Time is being's eternity in diaspora, a product of imagination, not intuhion.42

Special Naturphilosophie: Construction of the Particular
Potencies of Nature
The previous section treated the universal frameworks of nature; its treatment
of the dual nature of the particular corresponds to the metaphysical deduction of individuals in the 1801 Presentation. Wbere that work talked of the
particular or individual entity in terms of identity's appearing as quantitative difference, the Wtirzburg System speaks of relative being and nonbeing
that constitutes the particular, or the cloaking of intrinsic or spontaneous
activity of the monadic instance under the guise of externally compelled or
mechanical motion.
In the present section, Schelling has a more complicated picture of nature.
its organization, and its products. There are the three powers or potencies of
nature (as in Schelling's other essay in the philosophy of nature) displayed
in the three dimensions, and further divided into form and substance. Inorganic nature is depicted in the first two powers, with the first or more or less
objective power displaying a centrifugal movement from unity to totality, or
metamorphosis; the second more or less subjective power displays a reverse
or centripetal movement, a return to unity that is denominated dynamic
process.43 Under •form' are ranged the familiar objective features of nature,
formerly displayed under the title ' dynamic process': cohesion, magnetism,
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electricity, and chemical transformation. Under 'substance' (Substanz, not
Wesen.) are ranged four processes of transformati on or development (comprising the Evolutionsreihe): earth, fire, air, and water in the first or objective
potency, and phenomenological properties such as sound, light, and warmth
in the second or subjective potency. 44 All the properties and processes discussed are ideal, or features of nature as it appears to us; nature bas no objective or in-itself properties-the so-called elements that empirical chemistry
attempts to isolate-for nature is but the one substance or matter appearing
under different powers or exponents.45
I have presented these features in more or less the reverse order that
Schelling derives them, for I want to call attention first, to the dynamic
language of Schelling's categories and classifications such as Evolution and
Metamorphosis, and secondly, to the way all the processes be discusses point
to the third potency, organism, and in particular to discussions of physiology
that are new to this presentation of the philosophy of nature: sound, light and
warmth are phenomena for beings so organized as to have ears, eyes, and
skin capable of registering variations in temperature. Nature appears only to
the kind of particular being capable of perceiving its activities and processes.
If there were no subjects of perception, there would be no nature. The perceiving subject, however, is in nature as a part of nature-or as nature folded
back upon itself. Says Schelling:
Simply considered, absolute substance is not intuiting; it is pure intuition. Only
in connection to the organism is it mere intuiting. In sensibility the innennost
and most holy reaches of nature are thrown open as it were, and its true essence
brought to light. Here the student might le arn to turn at tltis point of the construction back to the fundamental axiom for the construction of the essence of
nature, which reads: As affirmed, the essence of nature is to be affirming, in infinite ways. At this point, where it appears as such in concreto, this will doubtless
become wholly meaningfu1.46

At this point, Schelling' s reader might well turn back to the beginning of this
section on special philosophy of nature and examine the twelve axioms that
Schelling advanced for understanding the metaphysics of nature. One might
see there an eclectic mix of elements borrowed from Plato, Spinoza, and
Leiboiz, but one might better see a struggle to craft a metaphorical language
free of precise reference to extension, force, imaging, perception, subjectivity
or biological life but fundamental enough to support all these overlays upon the
primal ontological deed: affirmation or expression-or perhaps articulation.41
The vocabulary available to Schelling is at once too tied to particular domains
of nature, Life, or mind and too pallid to express the 'decision' or 'leap' from
nonbeing into being that is the core of things' originating in while springing
forth from being's sheer power. The need to create new language or violentJ y
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appropriate the modes of speech of past thinkers-or to do both at once--will
characterize Schelling's later thought, and while there is something irritating
about it, it is at least resourceful when compared to the 1801 Presentation's
drab palette of mathematical and geometrical properties and logical relations.
The ontological thinker is forced both to borrow and break the language of
others and will end up looking like both anarchist and plagiarist.
With this in mind we can turn to Schelling's axioms for nature:
1. Similar to infinite substance, nature is the identity of affirnting and
affirmed, expressed in the exponent of objectivi ty or the real.
2. Nature is in itself the creative and productive idea, though it appears as
merely produced or created.
3. The items that compose nature stand to nature itself as things do to
infinite substance.
4. In each thing or form of expression, a universal core (Wesen) is j oined to
a particular form.
5. The core reality of the things of nature is the true idea, but subjected to
the form (or style) of 'reality' in material things.
6. If a thing is not or does not contain its own identity, it is subject to an
external identity as its ground.
7. There is no causal interaction among things; each is a microcosm.
8. Things are joined interoalJy, as Leibniz expressed it in his notion of petite

perceptions.
9. Finite things maintain their particular being by preserving a constant
ratio of rest to motion, or being affirmed to affirmation, or limitation to
position.
10. This constant relation or homeostasis is maintained by reciprocal or
interdependent change.
11. Both in substance and expression, the part of nature and its totality are
the same.
J2. Everything in nature pertains to the being and idea of infinite substance.48
Nothing in the above list of axioms is (or ought to be) surprising. Each axiom
bas historical precedents in the histories of philosophy and of physics. Each is
broadly true of material nature and can be extrapolated to express the characteristics of both the organism and mind. And each is relati vely bum-drum:
philosophy may start in wonder but ought not conclude to the astonishing.
In particular topics of Naturphilosophie, the Wtirzb urg system is innovative
in its tendency to argue that the higher-order phenomena of li ving systems
replicate the movement between polar opposition and identification seen in
the lower-order phenomena of the dynamic process: magnetism, electricity, and chemical transformation, without imposing a single explanatory
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paradigm. as Goethe djd with expansion and contraction in the morphology
of plants.49 Schelling does take over Goethe's term metamorphosis, however,
as a label for the centrifugal activity of the whole first or finite potency, where
successive forms of activity are viewed as accidents of a constant 'matter.'
In the second or infinite potency, termed dynamic activity, there is a constant
centrifugal activity whiJe various chemical 'matters' come and go; activity
occurs in the different for the sake of identity and the restoration of identity. 50
The same two comprehensive or general potencies, considered as at rest rather
than in motion, focus on the chemical process where two series of processesone productive of 'seltbood,' another destructive of stability, and their joint
product are likened to the composition and decomposition of hydrogen and
oxygen in water. There are no primitive ' matters' or elements in nature such
as empirical chemistry was beginning to establish, only one substance under
various exponents or potencies.5 1 One can poeti cally speak of four proto-elements or processes, as did various ancient Western and Eastern cultures: earth
(the soul of selfbood), phlogiston or air (dissolution), water (the antithetical
principle) or nitrogen, and fue (all-consuming dissolution) or oxygen.52
There seems to be something quaint or highly philosophical (as opposed
to 'empirical' ) in the explanations Schelling advances here. Even when the
same levels of phenomena are explained in a more 'nuts-and-bolls' way
via cohesion, gravity on the micro scale, Schelling argues that all physical
explanation can be translated into the language of 'chemism,' and the latter
interpreted in terms of cohesion. But differences in cohesion are explained
not by any change in substance, but only an al teration of form. The so-called
elements advanced by empirical chemists are produced merely by changes
of state in the one perduring matter, one form supervenient upon another. 53
At a crucial point of summary and transition, S.chelling makes clear that to
this point he has offered two sorts of explanation, one in terms of substance
and another in terms of process or form. So the first or finite potency is
exhausted in the dual orders of cohesion, on the one hand, and the transforrnative cycle of elements or 'matters' on the other. The same t.h.ing happens
in the second or infinite potency. except be has to this point mentioned only a
real series or dynamic activity: cohesion, magnetism, and electricity. To this
is added a series of alterations in the ideal order where magnetism appears as
sound, electricity as light, and chemical dissolution as warmth.54 Bringing all
these four sets of explanations together, Schelling speaks of the scaffold of
nature as the "evolutionary series of matter," including matter's appearance.55
Naturphilosophie is at the threshold of phenomenology; the table is set for
the arrival of the subject.
Throughout the constructions of the Special Naturphi/osophie Schelling
repeatedly says that matter is one and that the hierarchy of forms that nature
evolves is one sole process, formation or the in-formation of the universal
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and the particular. Put another way, the universal process is depotentiation or
the resolution of apparent solidity and separateness of entities into the ideality of fire, which is warmth, light and life.56 This nee-Aristotelian hylozoism,
which is decidedly philosophy of nature, not philosophy of science as we
know it, strives to display biological life and the life of mind at the center
of nature-the so-called anthropic program. Fundamental to this program is
the display at higher reaches of nature of the coalescence of particularity and
universality, gravity and light, light and life. 57 The key piece of evidence for
this ambitious construction (we might say reconfiguration) of nature is the
organism where an inbuilt teleology turns activity back upon itself in selfsustaining configurations; Schelling says of the organism that it depends not
on the (apparent) substance of its matters or components, but on their accidents, whereby the part or function subsists only in and with the whole. This
structure gives ri se to a self-directing or self-programming purposiveness,
the very opposite of the linear teleology bwlt into a machine from without.58
Schelling's discussion of the organism is too complicated to follow in
detail here, but it follows the pattern of earlier discussions where the organism is assigned three levels or exponents of realization: reproduction, irritability, and sensibility. Reproduction is viewed as a higher form of cohesion,
with respiration, secretion, and assimilation likened to organic versions of
magnetism, electricity, and chemical interaction. Sexual reproduction in
dimorphic plants and animals points toward the spiritual domain; in the firs t,
each could be absolute but instead seeks the absolute in its other, while in
love each person could be the totality but instead wills the other and seeks it.59
Goethe's paradigm of expansion and contraction is appropriated to treat
topics in embryology and physiology. Muscular movement exhibits both
activities. The circulation of blood in the arteries and veins is also explained
by this alteration; it is the first dimension of irritability, while the second is
respiration, and the third voluntary muscular movement arranged symmetrically in the dimension of breadth.60
Sensibility is the place where subjectivity breaks out in the organism; the
nature of the identity of affirming and affirmed points toward the ideality of
nature as a whole. In the forms of sensibility, absolute substance becomes
pure intwtion, pure seeing, and the inner life of matter is revealed as the
identity of being and perception. 61
Perceptivity is not something accidental in matter, it is its essence or very substance, since the core being of matter is idea. Perception and substance are not
joined as items standing alongside each other, as if matter were somehow doubled; the being of one directly is the other. This is the chief thing to understand
not just here in this construction, but in the whole doctrine of matter. Matter as
matter is already perceptivity.62
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There is at times something forced or a little too ingenious in Schelling' s
inclusive classifications. That sound is extended to cover touch and the latter
to include taste is one instance, but that sensory primacy is given to bearing
rather than to sight as the first organic interplay of the finite and the infinite
seems appropriate, given that thought is nested in language and .. [l]anguage is
the most sublime thing in nature, the word made flesb."63 But naturalism need
not mean vulgar or reductive materialism. Schelling is enough of a materialist
to see that thought is located and, as it were, embodied in the brain, and that
the intersubjective world of spirit is similarly located in language (Sprache).
At this point the objects of science and philosophy (and religion) coalesce,
for the human is the place where depotentiated identity-or the absolute
itself-is mirrored, where the natural and spiritual worlds join. A new natural
cience is needed to study this ' human-organism,' says Schelling-and today
this makes one wonder whether our neuroscience and artificial intelligence
can make do as the ' scientific anthropology' be calls for. For a philosophical construction can only identify homo sapiens as the e nd of nature and the
beginning of the intellectual (geistige) world, the being that, while not exactly
existing as the center or at the center of a planetary system, is itself the li ving
center of the cosmos. 64
Schelling bas m ore or less done what he promised Fichte be would do:
bring the tangent of naturali sm back to the circle of idealism; there is a
constructi on of the ideal world in the Wtirzburg system, but it is brief and
uneven and ends with a Hegelian apotheosis of the state. There is undoubtedly too much analogical reasoning and too little empirical evidence behind
Schelling's constructs for our tastes, but it is both surprising and heartening that in the end his gaze rests on the inner or invisible spaces where we
think the ·holy of holies' lies: the brain inside ~s and the web of language
between us.

NOTES
1. A95-96/Bl3l- 36.
2. A71 3/B741 - A718/B746.
3. Speaking more carefully. one must say that Kant offered transcendental deducrions of various jtems in ills theoretical and practical phllosopbies and used the tenn
transcendental idealism to refer to his whole epistemological theory. lt offers an antiskeptical justification of the use of human reason on a priori grounds, arguing that
various levels of subjective unification or synthesis are necessary conditions for the
possibili ty of ex perience. A transcendental argument is one that argues in two di rections: from X being a necessary conctition of Y, and from Y not only being possj ble,
but being the case, to the X being the case. Where Y is as comprehensive a thing as
human experience. the argument will be very broad.
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Fichte offers a careful explanation of the procedure near the end of his 1797 First
Introduction [to the Wissenschaftslehre], and one as broad as Kant's, for he insists that
one is able by this means to arrive at "the system of all necessary representations," or
experience as a whole (IWL, 31-32).
Paul Franks has recently called attention to the oddity of Kanll.'s insistence
that reason forms a system, and that philosophy's main challenge was to provide a
philosophy of everything. That everything can be explained from one thing or a slim
set of coherent principles is a theological (or onto-theological) assumption- no longer
widely made by philosophers. Philosophizing in Kant's wake, Ficbte and Schelling
face an absolute challenge: explain all or nothing. See Franks, All or Nothing, 368-72.
4. IWL, 109ff.
5. IWL, 11 3-15.
6. IWL, 11 6-18.
7. lPN, 58. For a philosophically provocative account of Schelling's earlier essays
in Naturphilosophie, see Grant, Philosophies of Nature after Schelling, particularly
chapter 6: "Dynarrric Philosophy, Transcendental Physics," 187-98.
8. lPN, 9.
9. lPN, 28-3 1.
10. lPN, 42.
11. FO, 16.
12. FO, 13.
13. FO, 22.
14. FO, 48-50.
15. VM, 105-9. Evidently this idea of a common transcendent Will that provides
to a multiplicity of finite or individuated wills the vehicle for the knowledge of and
action upon one another is what Fichte tries to communicate to Schelling in the difficult sketch for future revisions of the Wissenschaftslehre that he penned in the summer of 1801 and sent to Schelling on August 8. See Correspondence, in PRFS, 56-58.
See also Vater, "Erkenntnis and Interesse."
16. Correspondence, PRFS, 45-46.
17. Correspondence, PRFS, 44.
18. Cf. PRFS, 94-98 and 207-1 1.
19. Franks views the problematic nature of intellectual intuition as central to the
letters' cti scussions . When the tenn was first introduced by Fichte in his rev:iew of
Aenesidemus in 1794, it denoted access to the I's self-constitution: I am because I am.
If Ficbte now wishes to detach it from the first-person perspective and find in it access
to a self-grounding that is shared by all finite subjects, but not exhausted by them, the
intuition is problematic, almost as problematic as Schelling's stretching it to a thirdperson stance, a spontaneity equally on view in nature's organization and the finite
subject's agency. See Franks, All or Nothing, 340, 364-65.
20. Schelling published Escbenmayer's critique-"Spontaneity = World-Soul, or
the Highest Principle of Naturphilosophie"-in the first issue of the second volume
of his journal in 1801, and his Presentation of My System in the second. For a more
detailed discussion of the latter and particularly of the identity-theory pro pounded in
its first fifty theorems, see Vater, "Schelling's Philosophy of Identity and Spinoza's
Erhica nwre geometrico."
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Eckan Forster views Eschenmayer's challenge to Schelling's right to assume
the s tance of bein g nature's creator, and Sche lling's reply that intellectual intuition
allows insight into a sort of self-constitution which, while associated with agency and
personality in Lhe finite subject (the high est power), can be 'depotentiated' (or have
its exponent reduced) to s imply being the agent in nature, as one of the two crucial
points of the Presentation's metaphysics of identity. Intellectual intuition involves an
"abstracti on," an intentional laying aside of subjectivity. See Forster, The Twenty-Five
Years of Philosophy, 241-48, 285.
2 1. Presentation, PRFS, 14 1-42.
22. Presentation, PRFS, 145.
23. Schelling, On the H istory of Modem Philosophy, 120. In contrast, a lengthy
treatment of the philosophy of identity that Schelling offers in his first lectures on
the philosophy of revelatio n in Berlin (1841142) emphasizes the metaphysics, not the
natural philosophy, of the earlier period and credits it wilh three lasting achievements:
(J) attaining lhe status of a purely rational or a priori philosophy, (2) showing that all
the entities it considered were merely relative beings, admixtures of being and what
ough t not be. and (3) deducing as its result th e idea of God or the absolute, but in no
way touching upon its reality. See Schelling, Philosophie der 0./fenbarung, 111- 21.
24 . Presellfation , PRFS, 145-47, 158- 59.
25. Presentation. PRFS, 150-52.
26. Only if individuals exist solely inside the absolute can the systemaUcity
requirement for Spinoza's monism as formulated by Jacobi- no egress from the
absolute- be maintained o f indefinitely many finite instances of being-and-knowing.
Schelling tersely states this and comments that it is self-evident (Presentation, PRFS.
151 ). Schelling gets around this awkwardness in his 1804 Wtirzburg lectures on
The Complete System of Philosophy, where he returns to Spinoza's Ethics once again
and offers expansive explanations instead of the cryptic theorems of the Presentation,
by making the individual or item of appearance a dissociation of the panicularity
and universality of the idea as it is expressed in the absolute, de fining ontological
singularity in terms of privation or non-being. See Schelling, System of Philosophy in
General, 175-82.
27 . Presentation, PRFS, 155- 58.
28 . Correspondence. PRFS, 66.
29. Presentation, PRFS, 158--64.
30. Presentation, PRFS, 164-66.
31. See Further Presentations, PRFS, 211 - 16. From this point of view, it is the
presence of 'Romantic dig ressions' in the steady march of the axiomatic deduction
of 'scientific facts' that shows its author's real intentions and view s. The polemics
directed against "atomists" and " physicists," the scorn poured upon the disciples
of Newton who frame h ypotheses and design discrete experiments, the quixotic
defense of Goethe's ideas o f the 'unity of light' and lhe vanishing nature of color
in his color-theory, and finally the adoption of Goethe's term metamorphosis for
the b asic chemical process of oxidation and deox idization show that Schelling's
interest is directed to inte rrelations, processes and transformations in nature, not
discrete elements. See Presentation. PRFS , 174-80. Evidently, Sche lling found
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Goethe's attempts at illfuitive science more interesting than Goethe found Schelling's
Naturphilosophie. See Steigerwald, "Goethe's M orphology," 291 -300.
32. See Steigerwald, "Epistemologies of Rupture."
33. See Schelling, System of Philosophy in Genera~ 175-82. In the course of
1802 Schelling came to see that the true individuals of the identity-system are ideal,
organic individuals that in themselves establish ideality and reality, or universality
and particularity, in equilibrium, and hence that the pseudo- 'individuals' g rasped by
perception and reflective cogitation are ' fallen ' from that organic particularity into a
ecJuded fonn of individual existence. This withdrawal from the absolute is just the
reverse of the self-positing of the Wissenschaftslehre; it is limitation or the simultaneous positing of I and not-1, the s hadow of the absolute's complete and powerful selfaffirmation. See Further Presentations, PRFS, 215- 16; see also SW 6 :246-52.
See Whistler, Schelling's Theory of Symbolic Language, 90-100, for a cogent discussion of the issues Schelling faces in formulating the theory of ideas and the various
models he employs to communicate their trans-finite s tatus.
34. See Introduction, PRFS , 13.
35. Schelling, System of PhUosophy in General, 152.
36. System, SW 6:2 17- 29.
37. System, SW 6:232-36.
38. System, SW 6 :243-46.
39. System, SW 6 :250-58.
40. System, SW 6:256.
41. System., SW 6:266-67.
42. System, SW 6:270-77.
43. System, SW 6:318-21.
44. See the summary table, SW 6:269.
45. System., SW 6:307.
46. System, SW 6:433.
47. Schelling cJarifies the ' affirmation ontology' of the 1803/04 Wtirzburg Complete System in his 1806 essay On the Relation of the Ideal and the Real in Nature,
or Developmem of the First Principles of Nature-philosophy from the Principles of
Gravity and Light, where he emphasizes the dynamic quality of the connection-das
Band or the copula-compared to the relatively static items it connects: what affirms
and what is affirmed, or the ideal and the real, or substance (Wesen) and framework
(Form). See SW 2:259-61. A translation of this key text by lain Hamilton Grant is
fonhcoming.
48. System, SW 6:278-8 1.
49. See Forster, Th e Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy, 271 - 76.
50. System, SW 6:317-21.
51. System, S W 6:306-7.
52. System, SW 6:309-10, 3 15.
53. System, SW 6:341-47.
54. System, SW 6:354-69.
55. System, SW 6:370.
56. System, SW 6:346-52.
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60.
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64.
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SW 6:371-77.
SW 6:376-80
SW 6:398-408.
SW 6:418- 26.
SW 6:433.
SW 6:434.
SW 6:492; cf. 443-55.
SW 6:487-9 J.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Forster, Eckart. The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy: A Systematic Reconstruction.
Translated by Brady Bowman. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 20 12.
Franks. Paul W. AIL or Nothing: Systematicity, Tran scendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Universjty Press, 2003.
Grant, Iain Hamilton. Philosophies of Nature after Schelling. London: Continuum,
2006.
Schelling, F. W . J . On the History of Modem Philosophy. Translated by Andrew
Bowie. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, J994.
- - . Philosophie der Offenbarung 1841/422 (Paulus Nachschrift). & Hted by
Manfred Frank. Frankfun am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977.
- - - . System of Philosophy in General (partial translation). In Idealism and the
Endgame of Th eory: Three Essays by F. W. J. Schelling, edited and translated by
Thomas Pfau, 139-94. Albany: State Uruversity of New York Press, 1994.
Steigerwald, Joan. "Epistemologies of Rupture: The Problem of Nature in Schelling's
Philosophy." Studies in Romanticism 41 (2002): 545- 84.
- - - . "Goethe' s Morphology: Urphanomene and Aesthetic Appraisal." Journal of
the History of Biology 35 (2002): 29 1-328.
Vater, Michael. "Erkennmis and Interesse: Schelling's System of Transcendental
Idealism and Fichte's Vocatinn of Man." In Fichre 's " Vocation of Man ": New
lnrerpretive and Critical Essays, edited by Oanjel Breazeale and Tom Rockmore,
255-72. Albany: State University of New York Press, 201 3.
- - - . "Schelling's Phllosophy of Identity and Spinoza' s Ethica more geometrico."
In Spinoza and German Idealism, edi ted by Eckart Forster and Yitzhak Y .
Melamed, 156-74. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Whistler, Danie l. Schelling's Th eory of Symbolic Language: Fanning the System of
ldellfity. Oxford: Oxfo rd University Press, 20 13.

